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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
VERNON J. SMITH, ' 
Plaintiff and Appellant, i 
vs. CASE 
WILMER LEE BARNETI, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
( NO. 10320 
) 
Appellant's Petition for Re-Hearing and 
Brief in Support Thereof 
Appellant, Vernon J. Smith, petitions the Court for 
re-hearing in the above case upon the grounds hereinafter 
set forth. In support of said petition, appellant relies upon 
the following points: 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO RULE UPON 
POINTS RAISED BY THE APPELLANT IN ms BRIEF. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT. 
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POINT ID 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AS A WHOLE 
WERE PREJUlDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays that the petition for 
re-hea.rng be granted and that upon such re-hearing and 
after consideration of the record and the law, the decision 
of the Court be recalled and a decision entered in favor 
of the Appellant and the case remanded to the lower court 
for a new trial with direction to the lower court concern· 
ing proper jury instructions. 
S. Rex Lewis, for 
Howard and Lewis 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO RULE UPON 
POINTS RAISED BY THE APPELLANT IN HIS BRIEF. 
It is respectfully urged to this Court that the points 
presented by Appellant, points II through point VI, were 
not ruled upon by this Court as provided in the Utah Con· 
stitution, Article vm, Section 25, which states as follows: 
"When a judgment or decree is reversed, modified 
or affirmed by the Supreme Court, the reasons there-
for shall be stated concisely in writing, signed by the 
judges concurring, filed in the office of the Clerk" 
the Supreme Court, and preserved with a record of 
the case. Any judge dissenting therefrom, may give 
the reasons of his dissent in writing over his · • ture.,, s1gna 
Rule 76(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also 
states the law as follows: 
"Every decision of the Court, together with the 
reasons therefor concisely stated shall be in writing 
and filed with the Clerk. Any justice dissenting may 
likewise give his reasons therefor in writing and fiie 
the same in the case." 
This Court in its initial opinion disposed of Appellant's 
Point II through Point VI as follows: 
"Plaintiff claims prejudicial error on account of the 
Court's failure to give certain requested instructions 
(3) and its giving a number of other instructions. We 
have carefully analyzed these claims and find no merit 
in them." 
This Court cited as (3) the case of Wellman vs. Noble, 
12 Utah 2d, 350, 366 P2d 701, in whidl this Court held 
that it was not error to refuse to give an instruction on 
unavoidable accident. Appellant agrees with the Court 
that it is not error to fail to give an instruction on un-
avoidable accident. Failure to give such instruction was 
not involved in the present case. The present case involves 
the giving of an instruction on unavoidable accident when -
the facts do not merit such an instruction and the giving 
of Which instruction Appellant claims is prejudicial error 
as to his claim. Appellant respectfully urges this Court 
to make a specific ruling upon the lower court's giving an 
4~ 
~ction on unavoidable accident in a pedestrian-automo-
bile case such as this case is and encompassing the facts 
as presented -in this case. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT. 
Apparently Appellant· failed in his brief or in oral ar-
gument to adequately explain to the court the facts in-
volved in this case and that the giving of an instruction 
on unavoidable accident was prejudicial error as to the 
Plaintiff herein~ -
The Court, in its initial opinion filed herein, states the 
facts as the. ;plaintiff contends they were. More particu-
larly the. Court has stated that "the Plaintiff, while walk-
ing south in line with the sidewalk on the east side of State 
Street had covered about 2/3 of the distance of the en-
trance when he was struck by Defendant's car, which 
had come from the. north on State Street and was making 
a turn. -to east into Rainbow Drive. It was a dark, dry 
njght with some street lights." 
There . are no cases encompassing the facts as they 
existed in this case as this Court has found them to be 
where the courts have failed to say that giving of an in-
struction encompassing unavoidable accident was not pre-
judicial and reversible error. 
The Defendant, in his brief, found one recent NeW 
Mexiro case wherein the court approved an instruction on 
unavoidable accident, which is the case of Faulkner vs. 
Martin, .75 N.Mex, 159, 391 P2d 660 (1964). It is respect-
5 
fully pointed out to this Court that the New Mexico case, 
though not exactly in point, is a poorly reasoned case and 
that the dissent in th New Mexico case is well reasoned 
and complies with the majority rule. The dissenting jus-
tice in the New Mexico case agrees with the Plaintiff 
herein and cites 65 ~R 2d 12, 85. The dissent also states 
that people do not "loom" in front of cars, absent fog or 
smog or similar vision obstruction. 
The overwhelming weight of authority in the majority 
of cases is to the effect that such an instruction encom-
passing unavoidable accident involving the striking of p& 
destrians at or neaT a street intersection is prejudicial and 
rGversible error. The California Supreme Court holds it 
is error in any case. Butigan vs. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal 
2d. 652, 320 P2d. 500. This Court in the case of Wellman 
vs. Noble, Supra, wherein this Court affirmed the lower 
court in its failure to instruct on wmvoida'ble accident stat-
ed, p. 352: "Here the issue of unavoidable accident is not 
involved any more than in practically any other accideat 
case." (Emphasis added) 
This Court is again referred to the Annotation in 65 
ALR 2d p. 85, wherein it states that in the majority of 
the cases involving the striking of pedestrians at or near 
street intersections, instructions on unavoidable accident 
and inevitable accident instructions have been considered 
inappropriate and reversible error. Plaintiff refers the 
Court to the annotation and quotes some of the cases as 
follows: 
"McBride vs. Woods (1950) 124 Colo 384, 238 P2d 
183-Where the mishap resulted when the Defendant, 
whose car was parked diagonally, in a place marked near 
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a street: ~te~~· backed the car out in daylight, slowly, 
but strikmg Plamtiff, an elderly person who was passing 
on the crosswalk and moving somewhat in the direction 
the vehicle was backed. The Defendant did not see the 
Plaintiff, nor was he immediately aware that he had struck 
her, and he testified that, 'It was not possible to back out 
of that pru-king space and miss the car ahead and get into 
my own lane without backing into the crosswalk.' He con-
ceded that the bum~r of his car was backed into the cross-
walk a distance of about 3 feet. The court following a 
verdict for the ~fendant held it was error to submit to the 
jlll'Y the question of unavoidable accident, 'where there is 
absolutely no evidence in the case which warrants a sub· 
mission' of such question, 'all evidence clearly showing that 
the accident could have been avoided.'" (Emphasis added) 
P. 86. In Quillin vs. Colquhoun, (1925) 42 Idaho 522, 
247, P. 740--wherein a pedestrian suffered injuries at or 
near a street intersection, the court, in reversing the judg· 
ment for Defendant, disapproved of the inclusion of the 
words "an accident" in the instruction that if the jW'Y 
found from a preponderance of evidence that the misad· 
venture "was an accident and not attributable to the neg· 
ligence of anyone" the verdict should be for the Defendant. 
P. 86. In the Missouri case of Jones vs. Goldberg, 
78 SW2d 509--a pedestrian was injw."'ed at a street inter· 
section. It was held that the evidence merely presented 
issues- of negligence and contributory negligence, that there 
was no basis for the giving of a so-called accident instfUC· 
tion to the effect that if Plaintiff's injuries were caused by 
an accident, mischance or misfortune, and not by any neg· 
ligence on the part of the defendant contributing thereto, 
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plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Consequently it was 
held that the giving of the instruction was error and war-
ranted the trial court in granting a. new trial after a ver-
dict for the defendant. (Emphasis added) 
P. 89. In the case of Orr vs. Hart, (1934) 219 Iowa 
408, 258 NW 84-a street pedestrian case, it was held error 
to give an unavoidable accident instruction inasmuch as 
"the record shows conclusively that this accident happened 
through the fault and negligence of one or bo1lh of the par-
ties thereto.'" (Emphasis added) 
P. 89. In the case of Smith vs. Johnson (1954) 2 m. 
App. 2d 315, 120 NE 2d 58---a case of injury to a street 
pedestrian, it was held error to give an accident instruc- . 
tion inasmuch as there was no evidence that the pedes-
trian' s injuries were sustained by accident alone not coup-
led with negligence. 
P. 89. In Levans vs. Vigne, (1936) 339 Mo. 550, 98 
SW2d 737-a street pedestrian case, it was held not error 
to refuse to give an accident instruction since the case pre-
sented an issue of negligence of defendant and not of cu-. 
ualty from an unknown cause. 
It is stated in 1 Blashfield Encyclopedia of Automobile· 
Law & Practice, Section 635, Ohapter 15, p. 485: 
"A mere accident being one in which neither party 
is at fault the mere fact that neither drtver of two 
automobil~ coUiding with each other saw the other 
until too late to avoid the collision is not enough to 
show that the accident was unavoidable, since in such 
a case the negligence, if any, producing the situa-
tion determines the liability, so that if either party can 
avold an accident by the exercise of proper ca.re it can-
not be said to be unavoidable. For example, if a blow~ 
... 
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out occurs but the driver of the car is reckless ti 
blowout is no defense." ' i.e 
. "In other words, the issue of unavoidable accident 
arises only under evidence showing the accident hap-
pened from an unknown or unforeseen cause or in an 
unexplainable manner, which circumstances rebut de-
fendant' s allegd negligence.* * *" 
In this case, the Plaintiff was walking back to his place 
of business on the sidewalk on the east side of State Street. 
The Plaintiff looked to his left, or east cm Rainbow Drive, 
for traffic that may have been going west on Rainbow 
Drive. Plaintiff looked for traffic coming north on State 
Street and Plaintiff looked to his right to see if any ve-
hicles were in the left-turn lane for southbound tTaffic. 
There was no traffic in the left-turn lane for southbound 
traffic when the Plaintiff proceeded to cro~ Rainbow Ave-
nue going south to his place of business. Plaintiff had 
walked 2/3 of the way across Rainbow Drive, or 24 feet 
8 inches, which would have taken him approximtely 6 sec· 
onds, when he saw the Defendant's car lights on him just 
prior to impact. Plaintiff cried out to stop and attemp· 
ted to get out of the way, but could not. Plaintiff was 
run down by the Defendant in the cross walk, a sitting 
duck for the Defendant's well-aimed automobile. It is ob· 
vious that the Defendant did not look to the sidewalk or 
crosswalk area when he came into his left-turn lane. 
There was oncoming traffic, and the Defendant turned in 
front of the oncoming traffic. 
State Street is a lighted street and persons are visib~e 
upon the sidewalks and crossings along the street. It JS 
obvious that when a person turns his vehicle he does not 
have his head locked in a straight forward position, but 
that he does or should turn his head and eyes as he turns 
his vehicle. It is also obvious, and should be a matter of 
judicial notice, that headlights do not shoot a straight · 
beam like a piece of steel, but that headlights diffuse to 
the left and to the right. Headlights light up an area. at 
right ·angles from the direction the beam is pointed. If 
the Defendant were unable to see to 1his left while makng 
his left turn, had he looked, he should have exercised ex-
treme caution and even stopped, if necessary, so that he 
could see into the crosswalk area. It is further obvious 
that once the Defendant had left turned and crossed the 
traveled lanes of fu'affic, he had an additional 12 or 15 feet 
which was parking area that he crossed prior to reaching 
the sidewalk area during which time and distance his ve- · 
hicle was facing directly into Rainbow Drive. It seems 
obviously apparent that a vehicle will not stop within one 
or two feet as testified to by the Defendant when he struck . 
the Plaintiff. It also appears obvious that the Defendant 
was struck and knocked a distance of 20 feet, which. im-
pact dented the metal hood of the Defendant'& car and. 
caused grave injuries to the Plantiff resulting in a .sub-
dural hydrorna requiring an operation, and a ni.pttued .diSc 
in his neck that required a fusion. 
It should be readily apparent there was a miscarriage 
of justice, and that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages fM ·· 
his injuries sustained. It further should be apparent that 
the instruction on unavoidable accident may have been 
fatal to the Plaintiff's claim, and that the giving of the 
instruction was confusing and misleading to the jury, and 
that the giving of the instruction overemphasized the-~· .. · 
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fendant's case. The jury may also have considered that 
unavoidability was an issue or ground of defense separate 
and apart from the question of negligence and proximate 
causation. 
Plaintiff adopts the position of this Court as stated in 
the Wellman vs. Noble case (Supra) that "Here the issue 
of unavoidable accident is not involved any more than in 
practically any other accident case." 
If an unavoidable accident instruction is proper in this 
case, it may fairly be stated that it should be proper in 
practically any accident case. Plaintiff firmly believes this 
is not the law in this jurisdiction, that such instructions 
are not proper, are reversible error, and that this Cowt 
should so hold. 
POINT III 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AS A WHOLE 
WERE PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
This Court is ref erred to its decision in the case of 
Taylor vs Johnson, 15 U2d. 342, 393 P2d 382, wherein the 
instructions to the jury weTe disected by this Court, and 
this COurt concluded that, p. 350, "the instructions were 
misleading to the jury as to what would constitute negli· 
gence; that they were repetitious, and many of them were 
premised on factual situations which were not supported 
by the evidence. In vfow of the whole situation, the court 
committed prejudicial error in emphasizing its mstruc· 
tions as it did in favor of the Defendant and against the 
Plaintiff, and that therefore the Plaintiff is entitled to a 
new trial" 
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It has been previously pointed out to this Court that 
the lower court's instructions overemphasized the Defend-
ant's defense, including the order of the instructions and by 
wrongfully including an instruction on unavoidable acci-
dent premised on a factual situation which was not sup-
ported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits to this Court that 
its prior ruling on this appeal failed to consider the matter 
of prejudicial and reversible error by the court's giving 
the unavoidable accident instruction. Plaintiff strongly 
urges upon this Court that such error committed by the 
trial court was reversible, and that this case should be 
remanded to the lower court for a new trial, with direc-
tions to the lower court concerning proper jw-y instruc-
tions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. REX LEWIS, for 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
Delphi Building 
120 East Third North 
Provo, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
